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August
28, 2002, 1:50 p.m. By NR Editors, from the September 16, 2002, issue of National Review |
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or weeks, both
supporters and opponents of war with Iraq have urged that the administration
"make the case" for the military action it is presumed to favor.
From the opponents, the demand was mostly disingenuous: No case can be
made that would win their support. But supporters reckoned that the administration
was unwise to sit out the debate that it had spawned by talking about
"regime change." By signaling that he was unsure of what he
wanted to do, President Bush had given opponents of war — abroad,
in Congress, and within his own administration — an incentive to
hold out and, indeed, to lobby against a war. Public support for war with
Iraq, as measured in polls, has fallen over the course of the year (although
a small majority still favors it).
In late August, the administration entered the debate in a substantial way. Vice President Cheney made a speech claiming that Saddam Hussein is intent on developing deliverable weapons of mass destruction and that he might be close to achieving that goal. He echoed the president's contention that "time is not on our side." Cheney argued, against some critics, that it would be irresponsible to wait until the regime had those weapons before moving against it. It was not enough, he said, to insist on the Iraqis' compliance with weapons inspections. They had worked around such inspections before. ("We often learned more as the result of defections than from the inspection regime," Cheney noted, and Saddam tested missiles "almost literally under the noses of the U.N. inspectors.")
War against Iraq is necessary to avert grave dangers, he argued; but it would also yield great opportunities. American victory in the war would increase our standing in the region generally: "Moderates throughout the region would take heart. And our ability to advance the Israeli-Palestinian peace process would be enhanced, just as it was following the liberation of Kuwait in 1991." A liberated Iraq would undermine tyranny throughout the Arab world. Although Cheney was too politic to say it himself, the Saudis, the Egyptians, and the Jordanians would also have greater reason to fear the United States and would adjust their behavior accordingly.
Cheney makes a strong case. He will have to keep making it — and he will have to be joined by the president himself. If Bush asks for congressional support, he is likely to get it.
We should, of course, also seek the support of our European allies. The administration should make it clear that its most serious consultations will be with those countries that are willing to commit troops to the battle. If we show that we are willing to act without them, they will face the prospect of being shown — to themselves, to us, and to others — to be superfluous: unable to block American action and unnecessary for its success.
Above all, we should move quickly. "Time is not on our side" is one way of putting it; President Lincoln put it another way, when he warned General McClellan: "Your enemies will probably use time as advantageously as you can."