June 24, 2005
A Tactic for War, not a Proposal for Peace
[Bradford Berenson 06/24 03:12 PM]
The recent Memorandum of Understanding on Judicial Nominations signed by seven Republican senators and seven Democrats for the first time in our history formally recognizes the principle--if only temporarily--that a minority of senators can block a presidential appointee to the federal bench whom a majority would vote to confirm. As such, the Memorandum deals a significant blow to the president’s constitutional appointment power.
The Democrats in the Congress are now trying for more. Democratic party chairman Howard Dean, echoed by a phalanx of Democratic senators and representatives, including Harry Reid, Charles Schumer, and Nancy Pelosi, are arguing that the president has an obligation to “consult” with Senate Democrats prior to making judicial nominations, in particular for the Supreme Court. Schumer has said that the MOU is a warning to the President not to “nominate someone that’s way out of the [mainstream] and consult with Congress.” Indeed, the MOU itself advances the argument that the word “advice” in Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution means that the president should “consult with members of the Senate, both Democratic and Republican, prior to submitting a judicial nomination to the Senate for consideration.”
This is part of a long-running gambit by the Democratic party, as the party out of power in both political branches of government, to seize for itself some role in the appointment process not given to it by the voters. Several years ago, before his party hit upon filibusters as a way to wrest some control over appointments from the president and the Senate majority, Sen. Ted Kennedy and other Democrats made the same argument in a series of public statements and letters to President Bush. In the pages of the Washington Post, for example, Senator Kennedy urged President Bush to engage in “genuine consultation with the Senate” over Supreme Court appointments in order to avoid a confirmation fight and to respect what Kennedy asserted was “the Framers’ careful decision to have the Senate share the appointment power.”
While the idea is superficially appealing--after all, who could really oppose a little bipartisan consultation?--it is both incorrect as a matter of constitutional theory, and unworkable in practice.
First, let’s be clear about what the Senators are really proposing. They are not proposing anything that resembles what ordinary people would recognize as “consultation.” Instead, in the world of judicial nominations, “consultation” is Senate-speak for “advance veto.” Senators routinely complain about a lack of “consultation” not because they were not consulted but because, after extensive consultation, they did not get what they wanted. What the Senators are really asking is that the president share with them in advance the names of individuals he is considering for nomination to the Supreme Court and then eliminate any candidate to which they object.
Thus, Senator Schumer in a letter to the president concluded by saying that he wants “the opportunity to evaluate any candidates you are considering and provide input before any nomination is made.” And Senator Leahy admitted in his letter that his goal is “to help select a nominee.”
This is plainly not what the Framers of the Constitution had in mind. The records of the constitutional convention indicate that the original proposal in the Virginia Plan was to have Congress as a whole appoint judges. On James Madison's suggestion, this was amended to provide for appointment by the Senate as the smaller, more exclusive body. However, the framers had serious concerns with even this form of legislative nomination. This concern derived from their belief that legislative appointments tended to be driven more by logrolling, petty politics, local and regional considerations, and factional struggles than by higher-minded consideration of the merits of particular candidates.
The final compromise--nomination by the president with confirmation by the Senate--was based on a proposal by Alexander Hamilton. He explained it in the Federalist Papers as deriving principally from the view that an individual is more likely than a collective body to make choices based on merit: “one man of discernment is better fitted to analyze and estimate the peculiar qualities adopted to particular offices than a body of men.” Hamilton further explained that the Framers chose to vest the president with the sole power of nomination in order to serve another critical objective related to ensuring quality appointments that could not be served by giving legislators a role: accountability. According to Hamilton, the president would bear "sole and undivided responsibility" for making the selections, so that "[t]he blame of a bad nomination would fall upon [him] singly and absolutely."
The resulting text of the Appointments Clause envisions no role for the Senate, still less for individual senators, in the nomination process. It says that “[t]he President . . . shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint” Supreme Court justices. The Constitution could not be plainer that it is the president’s responsibility alone to nominate. The Senate’s role is limited to the process of appointment, by which the president’s nominee actually becomes vested with the powers of office. This understanding is confirmed by the historical practice in the Founders’ generation: On the unanimous advice of Madison, Jefferson, and Jay, President Washington, who sat through the entire constitutional convention, never consulted with the Senate prior to making nominations.
The wisdom of the Framers’ design has been borne out through the generations. While presidents, including President Bush, virtually always welcome advice and suggestions from Senators prior to nomination, “genuine consultation” of the type being pushed on President Bush by Howard Dean and Senators Reid, Leahy, Schumer, and Kennedy would be totally unworkable. Providing names and receiving feedback would slow the nomination process to a crawl and allow the Senators to dictate its timing. Names shared by the White House would immediately be passed to left-wing interest groups and sympathetic journalists, and potential nominees deemed undesirable would be preemptively attacked in an effort to frighten off the putative nominee and/or the president and his advisers if the president were not cowed by the Senators’ private predictions of trouble.
Moreover, given the vast gulf that exists between the president and these senators ideologically, it is virtually certain that they would never bless a nominee that shared the president’s vision of quality judging. The process of “consultation” would thus become a mere setup for failure and a powerful weapon for the president’s most committed senatorial adversaries in the blame game they would play when the subsequent confirmation fight got ugly.
President Clinton’s consultations with Senator Hatch, which the Democrats now cite as a model and a precedent for what they propose, actually provides an instructive counterpoint. Hatch did not demand to know whom the president was considering in advance; he merely suggested some names to Clinton. Moreover, Hatch suggested the names of the most eminent liberal judges then sitting on the federal appellate bench, even though he knew to a certainty that they held views contrary to his own on issues as fundamental as Roe v. Wade. It is no wonder that President Clinton found them acceptable.
By contrast, the Democratic senators are now demanding that Bush “share” the appointment power with them, advise them of his choices in advance, and let them “help select” the next justice. In doing that, there can be no doubt that they would show none of the open-mindedness that Senator Hatch displayed in recommending Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer. Far from supporting candidates skeptical of the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence, Democratic senators have vowed to use every means at their disposal to block any Bush nominee who does not violate his or her ethical obligations by pledging fealty to Roe in advance of confirmation. And the Democrats’ relentless campaign over the past two years to define some of the country’s highest quality, mainstream judicial conservatives as unacceptable “right-wing ideologues” shows just how ideological they are prepared to be in exercising any power they are given in the process of judicial appointment.
In short, the problem is not one of process, it’s one of substance. Liberal Democratic senators want liberal Supreme Court justices, and a conservative Republican president wants conservative justices. This circle just can’t be squared, and the proposals for “genuine consultation” should be seen for what they are: a tactic for making war over an eventual nomination, not a strategy for securing peace. This particular conflict will have to be worked out according to the durable process laid out in the Constitution itself and used since the beginning of the republic. The president alone will choose the nominee, and the Senate will either give or withhold its consent.
[Matthew Franck 06/24 02:20 PM]
A stopped clock is right twice a day, as the old saying goes. Today the Washington Post is a reminder of that adage, as Justice John Paul Stevens was a reminder of it yesterday, in his opinion in the Kelo eminent-domain ruling handed down by the the Supreme Court. Over on The Corner, there's been much discussion of the case, and I find myself in sympathy with what Ramesh Ponnuru and Jonathan Adler have said over there. But today's Washington Post presents me with a real case of cognitive dissonance. I find George Will completely unpersuasive, and I'd be prepared to defend every word of the Post's editorial. This doesn't happen to me very often.
Absolutely everything in Kelo turns on a) whether the "public use" requirement can be satisfied by some plausible notion of "public purpose" notwithstanding the fact that some or all of the private property seized finds its way into other private hands; and if so, b) what are the relative positions of the legislative and judicial powers in deciding that it has in fact been satisfied in the taking at hand? Stevens, for the Court, answers a) yes, and b) the judiciary has a very minimal role. Kennedy's concurrence answers a) yes, and b) the judiciary could afford to be, in some vague Kennedyesque way, a little more involved. O'Connor's dissent, joined by Thomas, Scalia, and Rehnquist, answers a) yes, and b) the judiciary must strictly monitor the legislature in such cases. Thomas's dissent answers a) no, unless the public itself has the right to employ the property now placed in new private hands (as with, e.g, a railroad), which makes for the most stringent possible judicial supremacy in answer to b). The four opinions thus span a continuum from judicial restraint to judicial activism, with Thomas, I'm afraid, at the wrong end of the spectrum.
O'Connor's dissent is, frankly, hilarious. It takes a special kind of nerve for her to dissent in this case, when she was the author 21 years ago of the awful ruling in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, which endorsed a straightforward land redistribution scheme far worse than what Kelo presents, and she does not repudiate it here. (Rehnquist joined her in Midkiff, by the way--a unanimous ruling.)
As one might expect, Thomas's dissent offers the more formidable originalist challenge to the majority's view. I have long thought that no matter how fresh or how venerable a precedent may be, it is not binding if it is an excrescence on the Constitution. And Thomas wants to scrape off two barnacles, of 20 and 50 years' age. But he doesn't stop there. He reaches back to some turn-of-the-20th-century decisions with which he finds fault, and even (to his credit) reports on the equivocal holdings of various state courts in the very early 1800s; he simply prefers some of these holdings to others, but for no very good reasons. I don't think his arguments are up to the task of opposing all these precedents, especially when he turns (as he did in the Lopez ruling on guns in schools 10 years ago) to Samuel Johnson's dictionary for a definition of the word "use." This is feeble. Foraging in dictionaries is not how one finds the most natural usage of ordinary words in legal texts. I may be tiresome in citing my hero John Marshall, but I can't identify one case in which he turned to a dictionary--and Thomas's favorites were surely available to him.
I'll end where I would have both begun and ended, had I written for the Court in this case. I would have held against the property owners on grounds that the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment has no application to the actions of state and local governments. It is interesting that Thomas, so interested in the original understanding, has nothing to say on the great fraud of the "incorporation" of the Bill of Rights by the Fourteenth Amendment.
[Edward Whelan 06/24 09:47 AM]
My NRO essay today on the Senate Democrats’ request for pre-nomination consultation explains why the Clinton-Hatch example is inapt:
Apart from the fact that one should tremble to cite Clinton as a model of presidential conduct to emulate on anything, the Clinton-Hatch example provides a striking contrast to today's situation.
Hatch (for whom I then worked) openly invoked the principle that the president was entitled to considerable deference on his Supreme Court nominees. For better or worse, his objection in practice to certain candidates was essentially personal--aimed at individuals whom Republicans disliked or who would create undue political difficulties for them--not jurisprudential. Clinton knew that he could work with Hatch and still nominate justices who were, from Clinton's result-oriented perspective, indistinguishable from the candidates Hatch raised concerns about. The same is not possible for President Bush with Senate Democrats.
Thoughts on Consultation
[Sean Rushton 06/24 09:45 AM]
First, Senate liberals are obviously trying to resuscitate the judicial filibuster with this demand. If the president does not choose to consult or does not choose to give the minority a total veto, look for them to claim it as an “extraordinary circumstance.”
Second, I don’t think consultation is a bad thing per se. If Patrick Leahy (D., Vt.) were as amiable and genuinely non-partisan as Orrin Hatch (R., Utah), it might make some sense. Clinton, after all, went to Hatch and said, “What do I have to do to avoid a big confirmation fight?” and Hatch replied, “Don’t nominate Bruce Babbitt or Mario Cuomo. Ruth Ginsburg would be okay.” As has been documented on this site, Ginsburg was no middle of the roader. Hatch was not refusing the president’s right to nominate a liberal; he just said that two very liberal former governors would provoke more opposition. Moreover, Hatch did not extort President Clinton into consultation with threats of Borking and filibuster.
If President Bush went to Leahy with a list of five or seven conservatives and Leahy’s response was, “Don’t nominate X or Y but A, B, and C would be acceptable,” that would be one thing. But as Senator Schumer (R., N.Y.) has said in the past, his advice would be to recommend Arlen Specter or someone similar. Nan Aron and Ralph Neas have stated they would vehemently oppose ALL conservatives on the president’s list.
If the Democrats want to pick a couple of nominees who they regard as particularly provocative, fine. But the Democratic minority is angling to deny a conservative president, with a conservative Senate--who campaigned on the need for conservative judges--the ability to replace a conservative justice with a conservative. Chutzpah!
Let’s face it: Kennedy, Durbin, Schumer, Leahy, and Boxer are judicial Terminators--they can't be bargained with, can't be reasoned with, they don't feel pity, remorse, or fear. And they absolutely will not stop, ever, until a conservative nomination is dead.
So, why not invite only red-state and moderate Democrats to consult? Bring over Ben Nelson (Neb.), Mark Pryor (Ark.), Evan Bayh (Ind.), Tom Carper (Del.), Joe Lieberman (Conn.), Bill Nelson (Fla.), Kent Conrad (N.D.), Blanche Lincoln (Ark.), Ken Salazar (Colo.), Debbie Stabenow (Mich.), Mary Landrieu (La.), Tim Johnson (S.D.), Max Baucus (Mont.), Robert Byrd (W.Va.), and Jeff Bingaman (N.M.) to the White House and tell them they have 60 minutes, three vetoes, and their home state press will briefed on their behavior after the meeting.
Consultation or Abdication?
[Jonathan Adler 06/24 09:40 AM]
Some additional thoughts on consultation over at ConfirmThem.com.
June 23, 2005
[Andy McCarthy 06/24 09:39 AM]
I noted a few months back that Judiciary Committee chairman Arlen Specter and Sen. Chuck Schumer have also urged the president to consult on judicial nominees. As I said back then, I don’t think it’s necessarily a bad idea. All the president would be doing is listening. It’s respectful to do so, he wouldn’t have to act on the advice, and you never know: He might learn some valuable information. Plus, it will serve the president politically to have done the reasonable and respectful thing if there is a filibuster down the road.
Nevertheless, if the president decides to consult, it should be made clear that he is choosing to do so in his discretion, not because he must do so to comply with the “advice” part of the appointments clause (Art. II, Sec. 2). The Constitution gives the president alone the power to “nominate,” limiting the “advice and consent” role of the Senate to the subsequent “appoint[ment]” of the nominee. There is no requirement to take advice from the Senate prior to making the nomination. As I’ve discussed before, lifting liberally from two great Americans, Alexander Hamilton and Mark Levin:
As Mark Levin has recently pointed out in his bestselling book, Men in Black (pp. 188-89), . . . in Federalist No. 66, [Hamilton] flatly asserted: "It will be the office of the President to nominate, and, with the advice and consent of the senate, to appoint. There will, of course, be no exertion of choice on the part of the Senate. They may defeat one choice of the Executive, and oblige him to make another; but they cannot themselves choose--they can only ratify or reject the choice he may have made." (Emphasis added.)
In Federalist No. 76, moreover, Hamilton offered an extensive explanation of the rationale, precluding any suggestion of a Senate role in nominations. The framers believed that reposing this power in the "sole and undivided responsibility of" a single official, the president, would "naturally beget a livelier sense of duty and a more exact regard for reputation" than could be achieved were the decision left to a committee. For them, a committee (such as the one Senator Schumer suggests) would only serve to multiply the number of "personal considerations" (as opposed to considerations of competence and fitness) that might result in poor choices.
Keeping with this theme of minimizing personal considerations, Hamilton also argued that because the power to nominate would be vested in the president alone, and because the senate would be limited to the power to overrule once the nomination was made, senators would realize that all they could achieve by overruling was yet another candidate of the president's unilateral choosing. The idea--which has rich resonance today--was precisely to discourage the unreasonable withholding of consent, since the senators "could not assure themselves," Hamilton wrote, "that the person they might wish would be brought forward by a second or by any subsequent nomination."
Again, I don’t think this means the president should rule out consulting on nominations. It has for years been a fact of life that senators play an important role in choosing nominees for federal courts in their states, and, as a practical matter, the executive branch, the judiciary, and political parties are so big today that the president is effectively choosing his judicial nominees by committee (or, at the very least, with a lot of advice) anyway. Seems to me there’s no good reason why senators shouldn’t weigh in, too.
But the important point is that the president does not have to consult. This is an important principle to maintain. After all, saying he has to consult would only be a small step away from the next logical argument: namely, that the president should choose from among those candidates the senators recommend. There’s no chance the president (or, one would think, any president) would ever agree to such a thing, but the rules of the game should be clear from the start. It would be better for the president not to consult at all than to leave himself politically vulnerable to the claim that he had agreed that the next justice should be chosen by some bipartisan group of senators.
[Jonathan H. Adler 06/23 03:48 PM]
I’m reminded that President Clinton reportedly sought consultation from Sen. Orrin Hatch when Hatch was the ranking minority member on the Senate Judiciary Committee, so there is some precedent for consultation with the Senate minority.
Ten Commandments and Remaining Cases
[Andy McCarthy 06/23 01:40 PM]
Howard Bashman outlines the remaining cases in the Supreme Court's term for which decisions are to be announced on Monday.
Dems Want Consultation
[Jonathan Adler 06/23 11:22 AM]
Every Democratic senator save Robert Byrd (including “independent” James Jeffords) has signed a letter calling on President Bush to “consult” with Senate Democrats before naming any Supreme Court nominee, according to this report. One question: Has any president ever consulted with the Senate minority before naming a Supreme Court pick--when his own party had a majority of the Senate?
Today's Supreme Court Opinions
[Andy McCarthy 06/23 10:48 AM]
The Supremes have issued several decisions this morning, but appear to be putting the most anticipated ones off until next week. In the most notable decision today, the Court ruled 5-4 in Kelo v. City of New London that local governments may seize the private property of homeowners or private businesses for the purpose of promoting private economic development.
Useful early rundown of today's decisions can be found at scotusblog.
June 22, 2005
Gonzales, Recusal, and Partial-Birth Abortion
[Edward Whelan 06/23 09:39 AM]
Bill Kristol’s speculation about a Gonzales-for-O’Connor nomination calls to mind a stark but entirely foreseeable consequence of the recusal obligations that a Justice Gonzales would face--the invalidation of the federal partial-birth abortion act.
Recall that in 2000 the Supreme Court, in Stenberg v. Carhart, invalidated Nebraska’s partial-birth abortion statute by a 5-4 vote, with O’Connor providing the decisive fifth vote. A couple years ago, as a key part of his efforts to build a culture of life, the president signed into law a federal partial-birth abortion act.
Any nominee by President Bush to replace O’Connor could reasonably be expected to provide a fifth vote to uphold the federal partial-birth abortion act. But Gonzales, as justice, would almost surely be recused from hearing a case presenting the question of the act’s constitutionality. It seems a safe assumption that, as White House Counsel, he advised President Bush on the constitutionality of the partial-birth legislation at the time that the President signed it. It further seems a safe assumption that, either as White House Counsel or as attorney general, he has advised on or supervised the very litigation that would reach the Supreme Court. Either way, 28 USC 455 would seem to mandate recusal. (Indeed, under the provision of section 455 requiring recusal when a justice’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” his recusal obligation could well apply for his entire career on the Court.)
From what I understand, it appears a virtual certainty that any federal partial-birth abortion case reaching the Supreme Court would involve a decision by the federal court of appeals applying Stenberg to invalidate the federal act. Therefore, the consequence of a recusal by a Justice Gonzales would (absent replacement of any other justices in the majority in Stenberg) be at best affirmance--invalidation of the federal act--by an equally divided court.
There would doubtless be countless more cases of great importance to the Bush Administration--some reasonably foreseeable, such as those involving the USA PATRIOT Act, others impossible to anticipate--where Gonzales’s recusal would likewise be required. In sum, the unique and invaluable role that Gonzales has played and continues to play as the president’s top lawyer is precisely why, notwithstanding his excellent qualifications, it would be sheer folly (or worse) for the president to appoint him to any imminent vacancy.
Look Up--Preemptive Strike
[Sean Rushton 06/22 06:43 PM]
Progress for America has a great pre-Supreme Court vacancy ad.
Bill Kristol’s Crystal Ball
[Ed Whelan 06/22 06:42 PM]
The always insightful and informed Bill Kristol speculates about an imminent O’Connor resignation and a nomination of Gonzales to replace her. His bottom line: "A Gonzales nomination would, in my view, virtually forfeit any chance in the near term for a fundamental reversal in the downward drift of American constitutional jurisprudence. But I now think it is more likely than not to happen."
Saving Judge Saad
[Sean Rushton 06/22 03:56 PM]
Marshall Manson of the Center for Individual Freedom rings the opening bell in the campaign to rescue Henry Saad’s nomination to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Gonzales and Recusal
[Edward Whelan 06/22 12:08 PM]
The Chicago Tribune article that Jonathan cites reports the “fierce opposition” that the nomination of Alberto Gonzales would encounter from conservatives. But let’s assume that conservatives were convinced that Gonzales would make an outstanding justice. I would like to explain more fully my previous suggestion that Gonzales’s recusal obligations under federal law would make it folly for President Bush to appoint him to any imminent vacancy.
Section 455 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides that a Supreme Court justice (or other federal judge) shall disqualify himself from a particular case “[w]here he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated as counsel [or] adviser . . . concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy.” It further provides that a justice “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”
These requirements were toughened up in 1974. Under the looser standards in effect before then, Justice Rehnquist was plagued by recurring problems stemming from his service as head of DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel. Among other things, he did not participate in the landmark case of United States v. Nixon. Although the Court’s practice of not stating the reason for a justice’s non-participation in a case makes it difficult to determine with certainty in how many other cases Rehnquist was obligated to recuse himself, circumstantial evidence indicates that the number of cases was in the double figures. In addition, there was considerable (and lasting) controversy over at least one case, Laird v. Tatum, where he declined to disqualify himself.
With the tougher standards now in place, and with the far more extensive role (compared to Rehnquist) that Gonzales has played as White House Counsel in President Bush’s first term and as Attorney General now, it would seem likely that Gonzales would have to recuse himself from virtually every case of importance to the administration. With all the other outstanding alternatives available, what sense would it make to nominate someone with all this recusal baggage?
June 21, 2005
Nominee List Narrows
[Jonathan Adler 06/22 06:19 AM]
As noted by How Appealing, this Chicago Tribune piece is a must read. Apparently, the White House has interviewed potential nominees, and the short list consists of Luttig, Alito, and Roberts. J. Harvie Wilkinson remains in contention, and the possibility of a Gonzales nomination remains. McConnell and Pryor (yes, you read that right) were also among those examined closely, the Trib reports. If accurate, this piece suggests the White House certainly expects the chance to name a nominee, and soon.
[Jonathan Adler 06/21 10:44 AM]
That is what Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter is suggesting. Does he know something the rest of Washington does not?
Just for Fun ... Who Voted for Scalia?
[Wendy Long 06/21 09:28 AM]
Let's review which Senators serving today were among those who voted, 98-0,
to confirm Antonin Scalia to the U.S. Supreme Court when President
Reagan nominated him in 1985:
Baucus (Democrat in Red State)
Biden (Judiciary Committee)
Byrd (Gang of 14)
Inouye (Gang of 14)
Kennedy (Worthy of note; Judiciary Committee)
Kerry (Worthy of note; known flip-flopper)
Leahy (Worthy of note; Judiciary Committee)
Warner (Gang of 14)
June 20, 2005
"it is about the Constitution"
[Kathryn Jean Lopez 06/21 07:28 AM]
Confirmed by the Senate, Bill Pryor was sworn in yesterday.
[Mark Levin 06/20 02:05 PM]
I don't speak for social conservatives, but I don't think their concern about Gonzales can be easily dismissed from a substantive or political viewpoint. They had much to do with the election of the president, and are an important part of the conservative coalition. Indeed, much of the dispute over these nominees centers around social issues, from the Left and Right. I also have some concerns about his tepid comments on illegal immigration. Given the string of immigration cases in which the high court has set national policy, and will continue to do so, I think we can do much better in selecting an originalist. And as Ed Whelan says, any nominee will face very vigorous opposition. We're likely to be replacing Rehnquist, and we should find someone just as solid.
Supreme Court Nomination Timelines
[Wendy Long 06/20 12:57 PM]
There hasn't been a Supreme Court retirement in more than eleven years, making this the longest serving Court since 1823.
Of 100 U.S. Senators, 56 have never even voted on a Supreme Court nominee.
Here's a chart (posted at the website of Judicial Confirmation Network, information compiled by Progress for America) showing how the timing of the nomination and appointment process has unfolded in the last nine nominations to the high Court, beginning with President Ronald Reagan's first appointment in 1981.
Gearing Up to Defend Potential Supreme Court Nominee
[Wendy Long 06/20 08:11 AM]
If there is a Supreme Court vacancy in the near future, the President will have great support for the kind of nominee he has promised the American people: a highly qualified and experienced judge who applies the Constitution and federal law faithfully and impartially. When the liberal pressure groups start slinging mud, defenders of the President's potential nominee will be ready to counter with the facts, as covered in The Hill.
June 19, 2005
Chief Justice Gonzales?
[Edward Whelan 06/20 08:08 AM]
Yesterday's Washington Post story suggesting that, in the event of a resignation by Chief Justice Rehnqust, President Bush might nominate Attorney General Alberto Gonzales to be Chief Justice seems to me highly implausible, but for reasons very different from the likely conservative opposition that the story discusses.
From my limited dealings with him when I was at DOJ and he was White House Counsel, I have a great deal of admiration for Judge Gonzales's intellect and character. And, although many social conservatives are suspicious of his record as a Texas supreme court justice, it seems to me not unlikely that his experience in Washington has made clear to him how destructive the Supreme Court's flagrant power grab in Roe v. Wade has been to the ordinary operations of democratic politics--and particularly how it has poisoned the judicial-confirmation process. I wonder, in fact, if a good dose of high-level executive-branch experience (such as Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, alone among the current members of the Court, had) isn't the best preparation for understanding the proper bounds on the role of the Supreme Court.
There are, nonetheless, three reasons I think it highly unlikely that Gonzales would be nominated:
1. Gonzales, both as White House Counsel and as Attorney General, has been invaluable to the Administration as the chief legal architect of the war on terror. There is no legal role more important to the Administration than the one Gonzales currently plays, and it is far from clear that anyone could fill his shoes.
2. If Gonzales were appointed, he would likely have to recuse himself from virtually all the cases of greatest importance to the Administration. With the loss of Rehnquist's vote, it is far from clear how the Administration could hope to win any controversial case.
3. It is sheer fancy to think that Gonzales's confirmation as Attorney General and his Hispanic ethnicity mean that Senate Democrats wouldn't use his nomination to the Court to (among other things) try to pry into the inner workings of the Administration and into Gonzales's advice on the war on terror. (As it happens, a former Senate Judiciary Committee colleague reminded me today that Republicans had similar illusions in 1991 that Democrats wouldn't launch a full-scale attack on Clarence Thomas.) The only sensible operating assumption is that any nominee will face a fierce confirmation battle.
Kennedy Likes One
[Jonathan Adler 06/19 07:53 PM]
Via Ann Althouse:
[Senator]Kennedy said that of the three oft-mentioned, younger appeals court judges who are candidates for the chief justice slot - J. Michael Luttig, John Roberts or Michael McConnell - one would be acceptable. "I'm not going to get into which one" because that would be "the kiss of death" for that person, he said.
"who fellow Senators might find it easier to quickly confirm"
[Kathryn Jean Lopez 06/19 07:49 PM]
The Cornyn for SCOTUS (nonsense?) continued on the CBS evening news tonight.
[Kathryn Jean Lopez 06/19 01:15 PM]
John Cornyn (SCOTUS long lister) has a letter in the NYTimes today.