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his column on Tuesday in the Washington
Post, Richard Cohen assails the recent House vote to ban
human cloning. While granting that the prospect of human cloning
is "scary," Cohen argues that the practice is "not
quite around the corner." Yesterday's announcement by Italian
scientist Severino Antinori that he intends to begin cloning human
beings in November shows that the question is indeed before us now.
Cohen responds to the arguments of bioethicists Leon Kass and Daniel
Callahan by saying that the two have not advanced any arguments,
only the conclusion that human cloning is "unethical."
Perhaps that is the only way Cohen could respond to the objections
of Kass and Callahan. A simple glance at their recent New
Republic piece reveals a host of ethical objections raised
by the duo (the piece even cites Kass's earlier, and more compelling,
piece).
To quote Kass and Callahan:
The vast majority of Americans object to human cloning. And they
object on multiple grounds: It constitutes unethical experimentation
on the child-to-be, subjecting him or her to enormous risks of
bodily and developmental abnormalities. It threatens individuality,
deliberately saddling the clone with a genotype that has already
lived and to whose previous life its life will always be compared.
It confuses identity by denying the clone two biological parents
and by making it both twin and offspring of its older copy. Cloning
also represents a giant step toward turning procreation into manufacture;
it is the harbinger of much grizzlier eugenic manipulations to
come. Permitting human cloning means condoning a despotic principle:
that we are entitled to design the genetic makeup of our children.
Cohen is right that these ethical objections are not expanded upon
in the piece. However, this is because the piece took as given the
moral objections to reproductive cloning, and focused on the question
of banning therapeutic cloning. It would be akin to faulting Shakespeare
for not explaining in Henry V precisely what happened in
Henry IV. If Cohen needs a summary of the objections against
human cloning, he would do well to read the aforementioned piece
by Kass.
One of Cohen's final arguments is that Republican leaders in the
House "substitute faith for thought. For a minister, that's
okay. For a legislator, it's a sin." But Cohen's own position
is one of faith: Faith that cloning will fulfill all the promises
he has made for it. Faith that technology will not be taken advantage
of by the "mad scientists" (like Dr. Antinori). Faith
that technological advances are indeed synonymous with progress.
Given the barbarism that the 20th century brought us, I should
think Richard Cohen might hesitate before making that leap of faith.
He did not hesitate, however, because of the relevance of cloning
to the stem-cell debate. "Think of what could be done,"
Cohen urges us, "with cells produced, not by a stranger, but
by the recipient himself." The House cloning ban included a
ban on cloning embryos for research, not solely for reproduction.
It could not be otherwise: It would be impossible to enforce a ban
on the latter if the former is not banned as well. For if a cloned
embryo were implanted, would the woman be forced to have an abortion?
Would we punish the woman after the birth — akin to locking the
hen-house door after the wolf has made his way in?
Those who defended embryonic-stem-cell research have long argued
that it would involve only those embryos marked for destruction.
It would not involve the creation and destruction of embryos solely
for research, we were told. Recent news reports that a company in
Virginia is doing precisely that should make us pause — as should
Cohen's own all-too-candid admission that he in fact desires
such "progress." Unfortunately, Cohen's logic is all-too-consistent.
If it is morally licit for embryos to be used for research, then
it is difficult to argue convincingly against the creation of embryos
for research — difficult but not impossible.
For one can be against human cloning without opposing embryonic-stem-cell
research on embryos that might otherwise be discarded. The creation
of genetically identical individuals is far different from any advances
in reproductive technology that allow a man and a woman to reproduce
more efficiently. But one cannot support so-called therapeutic cloning
without tacitly endorsing reproductive cloning. Cohen sees this
clearly; his conclusions may be wrong, but his logic is sound. In
the battles ahead, conservatives must be prepared to argue not just
against the specter of reproductive cloning that looms ahead, but
also against the "therapeutic" cloning that is now taking
place.
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