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September
6, 2002, 9:35 a.m. By Thomas D. Grant |
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idding
the world of a dangerously armed dictator stands out as the most prominent
rationale for regime change in Iraq. It is, not, however, the only one.
Though the risk that Saddam will use weapons of mass destruction may alone present a compelling case for action, a number of affirmative factors also deserve consideration in our assessment of what to do about Iraq. Five of them in particular stem from the character of Iraq, its region, and its people.
A functioning secular Arab state. Failures in education have left even the richest Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf monarchies, bereft of a labor force with the skills to run a modern economy. Failures in civil society have propelled more and more Arabs into the ranks of radical religious movements, whether the Wahhabi sects of the Arabian peninsula, the Islamic Brotherhood of Egypt, the revolutionary guerilla army in Algeria, or the transnational network of al Qaeda.
Iraq, Saddam notwithstanding, distinguishes itself on this unhappy landscape. Bernard Lewis, dean of Western scholars of the Near East, has repeatedly emphasized that Iraq possesses the region's most-secular and best-educated population. The position of women in Iraq at least approximates Western standards. Iraqi engineers are competent enough and numerous enough to have put the country's infrastructure back in order after the Gulf War. That other members of Iraq's technocracy use their skills to machine the parts necessary for nuclear armaments only emphasizes the point. What makes Iraq dangerous from the standpoint of its military capabilities underscores its potential economic viability. What makes Iraq different from Arab countries rife with intolerant Islamist ideology underscores its potential to become a functioning state in the contemporary global environment.
Oil supply. Iraq exports oil under a U.N.-monitored system. One half to two thirds of the country's capacity remains idle under that system — thus removing a major potential source from the world market. As much as the market has benefited from Russia growing to rival the swing-producer status of Saudi Arabia, it would benefit yet more if Iraq returned to full production. With a stable and peaceable regime in Baghdad, the international community could lift the embargo on Iraqi oil — and thus further weaken the oligopolistic grip of the OPEC core.
Regional trade. Iraq, with its oil wealth, before 1990 had generated large volumes of trade benefiting its neighbors. Turkey perhaps traded the most with Iraq, while Jordan and Syria, with their smaller and weaker economies, depended on that trade the most. The embargo against Iraq has all but halted trade, only trickles continuing in the form of monitored exemptions and smuggling. The Central Bank of Turkey estimates that this has cost Turkey $30 billion. The best hope for economy recovery in Turkey and other countries hamstrung by the embargo lies in reintegrating Iraq into the network of regional trade.
Out of Saudi. An Iraq stable and without aggressive intent would facilitate disengagement of U.S. forces from Saudi Arabia. The presence of American military personnel in Saudi Arabia engenders continuing unease in the Muslim world and in Arab countries in particular. The irrational element of the sentimental pique is strong enough. American forces, with unveiled women driving jeeps and families with Bibles, well might affront the sensibilities of devout Sunnis, but it seems reasonable to speculate that, if Saddam Hussein had prevailed in his bid for dominance of the Arabian peninsula in 1990, the most uncompromising Muslims of Saudi Arabia would have met a far worse fate than ruffled dignity. Contradictions aside, evacuation of American forces from their territory would lessen tensions with Saudi society and with Arabs elsewhere as well. An Iraq without Baath expansionists and its military much pared down would permit withdrawal. Regime change in Iraq thus would open the way to end the chief complaint of Saudi radicals toward their leaders and toward America.
Iran. Finally, a secular and stable Iraq would present a new face to Iran. Caught in a tug-of-war between reformers and radical clerics, Iran well might benefit if a forward-looking government replaced an old enemy. The result would not be immediate or decisive. But it could exercise incremental influence for the better.
ANOTHER
AFGANISTAN?
Implicit in all of this is the need for stability in the aftermath of
Saddam. Iraq in chaos would hardly restore regional trade, increase world
oil supplies, improve security, or set good examples. The United States
needs to assess whether the toppling of the Baath dictatorship will leave
Iraq so weak and fractured that it requires massive on-going commitment.
In short, the question arises, is Iraq another Afghanistan?
A degree of after-action commitment to Iraq seems unavoidable, if the country is to be given a chance to recover from Saddam. However, regime change, with its multiple affirmative benefits to the region and wider world, also will bring gains to Iraq itself. These furnish cause for cautious optimism.
First, Iraq is not poor and will get richer. Soon after regime change, the country should experience a substantial increase in oil revenue. Ending an embargo that has kept Iraq's exports beneath half its pre-1991 level would mean more than doubling exports. Assuming a modest dip in prices for the commodity, oil, post-Saddam, would generate twice as much revenue as under the embargo.
Yet the revenue available to the new government for useful public expenditure would increase by an even greater multiple. Saddam infamously squanders his nation's wealth. Palaces, by some reports 100 of them, Republican Guard salaries, and crash programs to build and hide weapons of mass destruction absorb the lion's share of Iraq's embargo-curtailed income. Minus the embargo, the income increases. Minus Saddam, the income no longer disappears into the sands of megalomaniacal obsession.
Finally, Iraq would benefit from a freeing up of its entrepreneurial capacity and a reopening of trade with its neighbors., easing the way toward Iraq's stabilization and reintegration into the civilized world.
Action against Saddam,
though typically justified as a means to eliminate a threat, holds promise
beyond the added security that would flow from ridding the world of a
regime that has invaded and annexed a neighbor, used nerve gas against
human beings, and pursues as a matter of national priority expansion of
its arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. Post-Saddam Iraq contains
potential for local, regional, and global gains of momentous scope. In
deliberating Iraq, the other, affirmative dividends of regime change deserve
attention commensurate with their promise.
— Thomas D. Grant is the Warburg Research Fellow at St. Anne's College,
Oxford University.