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The Georgian Gambit By Nikolas
K. Gvosdev, executive editor, The
National Interest & senior fellow for foreign policy
and constitutional affairs, Institute
on Religion and Public Policy. |
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The announcement of the U.S. mission also appears to have broken the impasse between Russia and Georgia. On March 2, Georgian president Eduard Shervarnadze met with Russian Security Council secretary Vladimir Rushailo and announced that Georgia was prepared to engage in joint antiterrorism operations with Russia — something that Georgia previously had been loath to do for fear it would compromise Tbilisi's sovereignty. The foundation is now in place for a tripartite Russo-Georgian-American effort to patrol the entire area. Out of deference to Tbilisi's concerns, Russian troops need not be stationed on Georgian soil, but there is no reason why there should not be joint operations — including intelligence-sharing and monitoring efforts — to plug up the holes in the coverage of the border. Moreover, at the conclusion of the Shervardnadze-Rushailo meeting, plans were announced for a regional meeting later this month, between the security advisors of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Russia, to discuss plans for expanding antiterrorism cooperation throughout the entire Caucasus. The United States, however, needs to tread carefully in the region. For years, and even after September 11, many American politicians and media pundits downplayed Russian claims that Chechen rebels were receiving financial and logistical support from the "international jihad" movement orchestrated by al Qaeda. Many in the Russian foreign-policy establishment remain suspicious about Washington's apparently sudden "conversion" in this regard, and are convinced that "combating terrorism" is being used as a ploy to insert American forces permanently throughout Central Asia and the Caucasus. Caution and diplomacy will be needed to prevent any misunderstandings. The United States also needs to keep a close watch on Tbilisi. U.S.-provided equipment and technical assistance must be used specifically for the purpose of eradicating the al Qaeda presence in the region. Shevardanadze's earlier policy — turning a blind eye to the Chechen and al Qaeda presence on Georgian soil, as a way of tweaking Russia — is counterproductive. There can be no repeat of last fall's "migration" of hundreds of Chechen militants and mercenaries who left the Pankisi gorge, reportedly in the company of Georgian Interior Ministry units, to engage in fighting in the breakaway region of Abkhazia. Nor should U.S. support be used to forcibly subdue the separatist enclaves in Abkhazia or Ossetia: The conflicts can only be finally resolved with a political settlement, guaranteeing effective autonomy to these regions while reserving Georgia's territorial integrity. Indeed, on March 1, Abkhazia petitioned for "associate" status within the Russian Federation, out of concern that Tbilisi will abandon efforts at negotiating a settlement in favor of a military solution. Comments like that of Gela Charkviani, an adviser to Shevardnadze, to the effect that U.S.-trained troops would be needed to tackle "not only the Pankisi problem," do not help the situation. Most importantly, Washington must not allow Georgia to use the presence of U.S. military units as leverage in its bilateral relationship with Moscow. Russia has legitimate security and economic interests in Georgia that must be respected. (By way of analogy, consider how the U.S. might react if Mexico were to invite Chinese specialists to help patrol the Rio Grande.) As in Uzbekistan, the United States must be careful to avoid any misrepresentation of its role; it cannot be seen as a "quasi-ally" in the disputes and grievances that Tashkent and Tbilisi hold vis-à-vis Moscow or any of their other neighbors. Serzh Sarkisian, the defense minister of Armenia, made it clear that U.S. assistance for combating terrorism must not become an occasion for the emergence of new "blocs" within the region. Finally, the United States should seriously consider tabling the second round of NATO eastward expansion. With U.S. forces on the ground not only in former Soviet Central Asia but, potentially on the very border of Russia itself, now is not the time to raise fears in Moscow of "American encirclement." Putin has expressed support for the U.S. role in Georgia by casting it as part of the "efforts of the international community in the fight against international terrorism," and placing it within the context of a broader Russo-American partnership. Russia poses no security threat to the Baltic states. Its relationships with other neighbors, most notably Poland, have seen remarkable improvement over the last few months. Russian engagement is critical for achieving long-term stability in troubled regions like Afghanistan and the Balkans. Since there is no pressing need to enlarge the alliance, stabilizing the strategic partnership with Russia — rather than using NATO expansion as a poor man's substitute for admitting Eastern European countries to the European Union — should take precedence. The stated goal of the U.S. mission to Georgia — eliminating another nexus for international terrorism in the Pankisi gorge — is an objective the Russians can support. Let's make sure that remains its only goal. |
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he
sending of hundreds of special forces to Georgia as part of a technical-assistance
program to combat terrorism was a gamble that, so far, appears to
have paid off. This effort, after all, is urgently needed. In addition
to housing al Qaeda operatives, the Pankisi Gorge in northeastern
Georgia — the target of the planned operation — is a major
transit point for weapons and narcotics. The lack of any effective
government control over the area has also made it a storage center
and safe haven for both terrorists and organized crime; indeed,
the area is used as a hiding place for kidnap victims and hostages
seized from all over the Caucasus.
