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aircraft carriers USS Enterprise, Vinson, and Roosevelt
have about 50 to 60 strike (bomb-dropping) aircraft per ship, plus
support aircraft for aerial refueling, command and control, and
electronic warfare. There may be an additional 24 F-15E Strike Eagle
aircraft in Oman, with other support aircraft throughout the region.
There are 10 to 15 B-1s and B-52s set up on the islands of Guam
and Diego Garcia (and plenty of B-2s in Missouri). There are at
least two AC-130 gunships in the region as well.
This is a package
of 210 to 220 strike aircraft, and word is that about 90 aircraft
per twenty-four-hour period are involved in attacks on the Taliban
forces opposite the Northern Alliance line and against other Taliban
and al Qaeda sites in Afghanistan. In reality, this is a light dose
of U.S. airpower. On Day 18 of the Gulf War there were more than
900 combat strikes by Air Force aircraft alone.
Why the big
difference? There is clearly a different target base. The U.S. cannot
arrange for anywhere near the region-wide basing rights it had in
1990. The enemy is intermingled with the civilian population of
Afghanistan, as well as some potential U.S. allies within the Afghan
resistance. Much of what we are looking for is very hard to find,
and not necessarily amenable to air strikes. It is very much a different
war.
Rear Admiral
John Stufflebeem of the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed surprise
at the determination of the Taliban. "I am a bit surprised
at how doggedly they're hanging on to power. For Mullah Omar to
not see the inevitability of what will happen surprises me,"
he said, adding, "We are prepared to take however long is required
to bring the Taliban down." The message is ambiguous. Did the
Joint Chiefs harbor expectations of a week or two of bombing followed
by the Taliban turning tail? Was the search for bin Laden concevied
as a search and destroy mission? If the Pentagon is just discovering
that these are tough warriors, then they may well be behind the
civilian leadership in thinking about this war and the future of
warfare in general.
This could
be what Secretary Rumsfeld is talking about when he says that we
cannot think of war in the same old ways. The whole military operation
in Afghanistan to date has been conducted so as to make it possible
for the U.S. Special Forces to do their jobs. Usually it's the other
way around the Special Forces support the "main operations."
And most soldiers, especially more senior ones, are not too confident
in Special Ops.
We're hardly
watching military business as usual. The Navy, instead of the Air
Force, is providing the bulk of the short-range tactical strike
aircraft. The Air Force is providing long-range bombers in conventional
bombing roles, plus a host of refueling, airlift, and intelligence
support - which is certainly outside their cultural preference.
Heavy armored divisions are not even being discussed - instead,
light, highly mobile ground forces are the coin of the realm for
this war. The purpose of this campaign is to sweep away the Taliban
so we can get at their "guests" al Qaeda
all the while winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan people
and feeding the refugees.
The Taliban
is reported to be "hiding" their forces within the shadows
of mosques and schools, most likely in the hope that the U.S. will
shoot at a tank or helicopter and hit a church instead. The Taliban
vehicles (if real) are not very useful militarily when parked next
to mosques and schools. There are also some stories that the Taliban
is dispersing their people into the cities. There might be some
truth to these stories, but it is difficult to run a country from
the cellar. As there are no apparent streams of Taliban fighters
leaving positions opposite the Northern Alliance, one wonders if
the stories are not part of a poorly conceived plan to frighten
the U.S. into leaving for fear of a bloody urban conflict. In the
face of the cave warfare that might be coming, this is not much
of a plan.
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