Stop This Train
The case against high-speed rail.

By Richard Nadler, editor of K.C. Jones Monthly & a former member of the Johnson County (Kansas) Transit Advisory Commission.
October 11, 2001 10:10 a.m.

ne unanticipated beneficiary of the September 11th terror has been the passenger-rail lobby. A majority of senators have cosponsored legislation to provide tax-exempt bonds and loan guarantees to high-speed-rail projects that pass governmental muster.

At first blush, the case for these subsidies is convincing. Heightened airport security will make it slower and more expensive to fly. Couldn't rail deliver a better ride on shuttle air hops? "The increase in the amount of time it will now take to clear airport security has added to the time it takes to travel by air, potentially making high-speed rail a competitive alternative in some regional markets," said Alaska Republican Don Young, the chairman of the House transportation committee and principal sponsor of the Rail Infrastructure Development and Expansion Act.

Then, there are safety concerns. "[S]hifting more travelers away from the busiest airports to trains would reduce the number of flights that have to be protected, and the number of sensitive judgments that have to be made, on the spot, quickly, about individual travelers," wrote George F. Will. "Congress should not adjourn without funding the nine-state Midwest Regional Rail Initiative."

But there are reasons for pause. First, trains are less safe than planes, with or without terror. Second, high-speed rail will not absorb all, or even most, of the travelers who abandon flight. Third, high-speed rail is colossally expensive. And fourth, the U.S. government cannot and will not fund intercity rail projects rationally.

Most major wars since 1840 demonstrate rail transport's tragic vulnerability to low-tech sabotage. Security for any modern transportation system must include security for its infrastructure as well as for vehicles. Air traffic requires intense security at key points, namely airports. But for rail, mile after mile of track, bridges, switching stations, and trusses must be protected from low-cost explosives.

What makes air travel seem more vulnerable to terror than rail is not technology, but passenger preference. Today, fliers account for 93.2 percent of U.S. intercity travel mileage. Trains account for only 1.1 percent. Given this meager percentage, even a large increase in rail traffic might not attract the interest of terrorists. But it would certainly be easier for them to disrupt trains than planes if they so wished.

Moreover, a transfer of passengers from planes to trains increases rather than decreases the risk of death. This year, the death rate per passenger-mile of trains will exceed that of planes by more than 10-to-1, despite the hijackings of September 11.

Second, most people who abandon flight for other modes of transportation will not choose rail. Today, intercity travelers prefer buses, which are not subsidized, to trains, which are heavily subsidized. Buses account for 5.7 percent of intercity travel miles compared to trains' 1.1 percent. Fares are a major factor, reflecting the differences in system costs. Buses share extensive state and interstate highways systems with trucks and cars. That system is funded largely through gasoline and licensing levies on vehicles other than buses.

Rail, by contrast, requires its own separate infrastructure. And true high-speed rail necessitates infrastructure separate from existing freight rail. European designs that reach speeds of 200 mph use electrification rather than diesel fuel for motive power. There are ways to minimize wear on the tracks, but they prevent the decoupling of cars. Jean-Claude Raoul, who designs these systems, note that this "limits managerial ability to an extent; cars cannot be added or removed readily to adapt to changing passenger loads throughout a day."

Congress has defined "high speed" downward from the European and Japanese norms (150-to-200 mph). Rep. Young's proposal qualifies cruising speeds of 125 mph as "high speed" (it's still one-fourth of a typical jet rate). It would cost less to maintain the infrastructure of a slower system. But it also reduces the number of flight routes against which rail might prove competitive. A 200-mph train can theoretically compete with a jet for a 500-mile trip in an environment of heightened airport security. But a 120-mph train cannot compete much beyond the 225-mile corridors that account for a mere 4.1% of daily passengers. And even in these corridors, many travelers will prefer to drive a car rather than take the train.

The third reason Congress should not fund high-speed rail is its cost. The fact that passenger rail competes so poorly with its less subsidized land rivals is a dead giveaway: This technology is horrendously expensive, requiring high and ongoing operating subsidies.

A 1996 feasibility study of nine high-speed rail corridors conducted by the Federal Railroad Administration concluded that commercial revenues would cover (on average) 28.7 percent of costs. Taxpayers would cover the other 71.3 percent. In one corridor — the one from Washington to New York to Boston — did commercial revenue estimates cover a majority of operation and maintenance costs (55.3 percent). In the Midwest, a system connecting Chicago and St. Louis would require an 86.4 percent subsidy; for a Los Angeles-San Diego route, taxpayers would be tapped for 84.4 percent of costs.

In a recent study for the James Madison Institute, Wendell Cox, a former American Public Transit Association board member, compared a proposed Florida high-speed rail system with its alternatives. Using realistic ridership estimates, he concluded that a "near high speed" rail system would exceed the cost-per-passenger-mile of planes by 710 percent, and of cars by 1020 percent.

"The most expensive airport expansions are five to seven times as cost effective as high speed rail," he wrote.

The fourth reason why Congress should not fund "high-speed rail" can be summarized in a single word: Politics. National planning for HSR corridors will inevitably incorporate the features that ruined "highway demonstration projects" and "urban mass transit." Projects will be initiated for geographic balance without regard to rationality. Local officials will be tempted to ignore looming operating deficits in order to get the bonanza of huge federal subsidies (typically the feds will match local spending 4-to-1). And feasibility studies will be falsified during the planning process to allow federal funds to flow to ludicrous projects.

Cox points out that urban rail projects, the precursors of high-speed rail, cost an average 46 percent more to build and 78 percent more to operate than their planning-stage projections. Ridership undershot estimates by 41 percent.

High-speed rail may yet find a niche. Proximate metropolitan areas that share business commuting and extreme levels of road and air congestion may find it feasible. (The Boston-New York-Washington corridor comes to mind.) But to entrust high-speed rail to federal authorities is to ensure its irrational development. This "new" infrastructure is a business entitlement in the making, less a transit strategy than a handout for constructors, unions, and the politicians who depend on them for reelection.

The events of September 11th do not change these facts.