Rout or Strategic Withdrawal?
Where the Taliban stands.

By Mackubin Thomas Owens, professor of strategy and force planning at the Naval War College & an adjunct fellow of both the Claremont Institute & the Ashbrook Center.
November 15, 2001 3:20 p.m.

ost commentators have treated the rapid advance of the Northern Alliance from Mazar-e Sharif, to Kabul, to Kandahar, as a rout of the Taliban. But not everyone agrees. Osama bin Laden himself has described the abandonment of Afghanistan's major cities as a new strategy, designed to pull the Americans into an open-ended guerrilla war that would favor the Taliban. And at least one American think tank shares this assessment of the events of the past week.

STRATFOR, a web-based global intelligence company specializing in regional assessments and strategic forecasting, argues that the Taliban retreat was the result of a conscious decision to shift from positional, frontal warfare to guerrilla warfare, an approach better suited to Taliban numbers and resources. "Contrary to appearances," reads a STRATFOR report, "the Taliban... were not routed. They are stripped to their ethnic and ideological core, intact, with most of their arms and equipment. They are also back in familiar territory and reinforced with the bulk of Osama bin Laden's Afghan Arab volunteers. The Taliban are now prepared to adopt a strategy more amenable to their tactical strengths and resources."

STRATFOR claims that neither U.S. air power nor the fighting prowess of the Northern Alliance can explain the rapid withdrawal of the Taliban. The evidence adduced by STRATFOR in support of its contention includes the following: that the withdrawal came almost without a fight; that the retreat was premeditated and orderly; and that rapid advances are the norm in Afghanistan, because of low population density and the uninhabitable nature of much Afghan territory. STRATFOR warns that if the allies misread the withdrawal as a rout, they are likely to find themselves mired in a nasty guerrilla war that will not be limited to Afghanistan. By pulling back to their core areas in southern Afghanistan, the Taliban have reset the clock on the conflict.

The STRATFOR assessment gives too much credit to the Taliban and too little to the United States and the Northern Alliance; but it does help focus attention on a grave danger — complacency. It was only a week ago that the press was full of gloom and doom. Now everyone seems to have jumped on the optimism bandwagon.

But today's euphoria is just as wrong as last week's nay-saying. The war so far has gone well for the United States. The Taliban have been routed. But now we are entering a protracted and more dangerous phase of the conflict — rooting out the al Qaeda network and Osama bin Laden. This will mean serious counter-guerrilla operations in difficult terrain and harsh conditions, against a battle-hardened and skillful adversary. But difficult as it may be, there is still reason for optimism.

The bulk of our counter-guerrilla operations will be carried out by well-trained special-operations forces (SOF). SOF are tailor-made for this phase of the war. Delta Force, Rangers, Army Special Forces, Navy SEALs, and Air Force Special Operations Wings consist of highly trained and extremely motivated men, specially equipped and psychologically prepared for the sort of protracted small-scale operations that will be instrumental in defeating al Qaeda. In addition, General Franks, commander of Central Command, has expressed interest in using Marines and possibly paratroopers in conjunction with the SOF.

As has been the case with others taking a more cautious approach to the current war, STRATFOR invokes the specter of the Soviet experience in Afghanistan. According to this view, the Taliban, operating out of core areas of rugged terrain near the Pakistan border, can interdict supply routes and harass American and Northern Alliance troops virtually at will. But as I — and others — have pointed out, the Soviet analogy may have limited applicability here.

To begin with, the Soviets faced a united front of Afghan factions, substantially supported by the United States. They then deployed a force that was much too small to deal with such a threat. And even these forces were undermanned for the kind of war required to prevail against unified, motivated Afghan guerrilla fighters.

Additionally, while Spetsnaz (Soviet SOF), airborne, and air-assault troops were generally well-trained and motivated, the bulk of the Soviet ground forces were conscripts who were not psychologically prepared for the war. And, most importantly, the Soviets were slow to adapt their preferred tactics to the requirements of a guerrilla war.

The Taliban are isolated, both militarily and diplomatically. This will make it difficult for their fighters to keep themselves supplied. The needs of a guerrilla force are less than those of conventional forces, but they'll still be hard-pressed to acquire even the basics of food and ammunition.

U.S. forces would have a number of advantages over their Soviet counterparts. To begin with, U.S. soldiers are volunteers. The quality of their unit training is high, and U.S. forces possess high-tech equipment that will enable them to negate many of the guerrilla tactics the mujahedeen employed against the Soviets (e.g., night operations). And finally, many in the SOF community have pointed out recently that U.S. and British special operators will have the advantage in winter operations, as a result of training and technology.

STRATFOR has provided a needed reality check. But there is reason for guarded optimism. Whether they were routed or not, the Taliban are now surrounded and isolated. Some members of al Quada have been flushed out, and it is likely that more will be in the near future. There is evidence that the Taliban and al Qaeda are turning on each other, and it may very well be the case that someone will finger Osama bin Laden to save his own skin. This is a good thing.

The war may be far from over, but if the terrorists of al Qaeda are on the run in a shrinking geographical area, and trying to stay alive as well-trained soldiers are trying to find and kill them, it's unlikely that they'll have the leisure to carry out terrorist attacks.