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remarkable experiment is currently underway in the Persian Gulf.
To defuse the Islamist threat, the emirate of Bahrain is gingerly
moving towards democracy. Although the island-nation still has a
considerable way to go, the promise by Bahrain's new emir to hold
parliamentary elections in 2003 appears to have seriously blunted
the anti-American rage that is currently sweeping through the rest
of the Arab world.
What is perhaps
most notable about the emir's democratic turn is that he acted entirely
out of domestic considerations. American pressure in favor of democracy
had nothing to do with it. In fact, Bahraini democrats reportedly
feel "betrayed" that despite our "false promises,"
Americans did nothing to promote democracy in the Gulf.
Of course,
we had the perfect opportunity to speak out in favor of democracy
and human rights in the immediate aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War.
That was when our prestige in the Gulf was at its peak, and when
a formal American endorsement of democracy would have carried tremendous
weight. And, in fact, former Vice President Dan Quayle had intended
to deliver exactly such a speech drafted, as it happens,
by me. How that speech was derailed by our foreign-policy bureaucracy
is a story not without relevance to today's events.
Shortly after
the conclusion of Desert Storm, Quayle's chief of staff, Bill Kristol,
asked me to draft a speech on the importance of democracy to the
Middle East. I responded that the state department which,
along with the national-security council, had to "clear"
the vice president's foreign-policy speeches would never
permit such a speech to be delivered. Kristol told me to go ahead
anyway.
The speech
I drafted had a distinctly moderate and sober tone. There were no
stirring paeans to democracy, no quotes from Jefferson or Lincoln,
no calls for a popular rising against military dictators and medieval
potentates. Instead, it simply noted that the lack of democratic
accountability enabled tyrants like Saddam Hussein to bring war
and ruin to the region. A greater respect for democratic norms would
promote peace and progress throughout the Middle East.
After completing
the speech, I faxed a copy to Professor Bernard Lewis, the eminent
Princeton authority on the Middle East, and requested his comments.
If memory serves, Lewis liked it.
Unfortunately,
not many people in the Bush administration agreed with Lewis. Shortly
after we began circulating the speech, the vice president's national-security
adviser received a call from one of the national-security council's
Middle East specialists, David Welch. Mr. Welch (currently our ambassador
to Egypt) reportedly said that under no circumstances could the
vice president deliver the speech. "The Saudis will go ballistic,"
he predicted, if the vice president of the United States actually
endorsed democracy for the Middle East.
Meanwhile,
Welch's boss, Richard Haas (then the top NSC official for Middle
Eastern affairs, now head of the state department's policy-planning
staff) wrote a memo to Brent Scowcroft (then the president's national-security
adviser, now the head of the president's foreign-intelligence advisory
board) strongly objecting to the proposed speech. Haas argued that
while the United States was certainly in favor of democracy and
human rights in the Arab world, saying so at this particular moment
would only complicate an already fraught situation.
The NSC was
not alone in its opposition to the speech. Dennis Ross, who headed
Secretary of State Baker's policy-planning staff, and who received
a draft of the speech when he was with the secretary in Saudi Arabia,
was also upset by it. Just how deep his hostility went became evident
when, sometime later, I ran into Ross's associate, Aaron Miller,
in a State Department corridor. "Written any new speeches lately?"
Miller hissed at me.
In the face
of such intense and concerted hostility to his proposed speech,
Quayle decided against delivering it. The democratic elements in
the Gulf, and throughout the Arab world, who looked to the U.S.
for some sign that we supported their efforts, looked in vain. Even
today, when it is clear that much of the Arab "street's"
enthusiasm for Islamist groups stems from decades of American support
for the corrupt and authoritarian governments of Egypt and Saudi
Arabia, there is still no call by the United States for greater
openness in the Arab world. Though support for democracy and human
rights reflect our deepest values, such a call would seriously annoy
the royal House of Saud and we can't allow that. Far better
to endorse a Palestinian state and try to resuscitate a hopelessly
moribund "peace process." The Saudis like such initiatives
and what the Saudis like, the Saudis get.
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