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February 25, 2004,
9:26 a.m.
Putin Purges
The Russian president changes the playbook.
No one should be surprised that Vladimir Putin dismissed Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov in the run-up to Russia's presidential elections on March 14. Ever since the overwhelming victory of United Russia in the December parliamentary elections, the handwriting has been on the wall for Kasyanov, viewed by many as a technocratic holdover from the Yeltsin administration.
Boris Gryzlov, the former interior minister who now serves as parliamentary speaker, candidly remarked in January, "United Russia won the parliamentary elections and gained the majority in the new state duma, and it intends to nominate its fellow party members to posts in the executive bodies of power." And Kasyanov is not considered to be "one of the boys." So, for United Russia's parliamentarians, Kasyanov's removal, they hope, clears the path for the creation of cabinet government — having the prime minister responsible to a parliamentary majority.
It's not that Kasyanov was a bad prime minister. After all, he presided over Russia's recovery from the 1998 crash. Putin himself noted that his decision did not arise out of dissatisfaction with Kasyanov's performance, "which I believe on the whole to be satisfactory." Yet Putin's relationship with his prime minister was not unlike those between French presidents and prime ministers of opposite parties (a situation termed "cohabitation.")
And Putin wants to move ahead with his program. Several days ago, Putin commented, "Cooperation between the legislative and executive branches of power has recently been based on efficient and well-organized work.... Such cooperation has made it possible to adopt laws crucial for the country and overcome ...disagreements." And finding a prime minister who can work well with the new duma is a priority.
There's also the succession question. The Russian constitution has no provision for a vice president; the prime minister is traditionally considered to be the president's successor. Last week, the duma rejected a proposal to extend the presidential term (in other words, to give Putin more years to serve as president), and constitutionally, Putin is barred from seeking a third term in 2008.
And here, I agree with my colleague Cliff Kupchan who has observed that Putin's efforts to manage the Russian political system have "vastly strengthened the presidency and the state bureaucracy.... Putin seems intent on imitating Japan's Liberal Democratic party as he seeks to create an entrenched party of power that will anoint successive presidents. Despite some hurdles, he and United Russia are so strong and other centers of political power so weak that the Putin machine will almost surely rule the country through two election cycles." One might also point to the parallel "south of the border" — the creation in Mexico of a successful presidential-party state that ruled for nearly seven decades.
The timing is also important. Putin could just as easily invoked his authority under Article 117 of the Russian constitution to dissolve the government after the presidential poll. Yet Putin understands the tremendous political symbolism in dissolving the cabinet at this time. Dismissing Kasyanov — the last major link to the Yeltsin administration — sends a clear message to Russian voters that Putin is now master in his own house.
And it makes it clear that further reform in Russia will not be conducted along the "Western playbook" introduced by Yeltsin. No matter who is appointed as prime minister — -whether it be Sergei Ivanov, Dimitri Kozak, or another member of the inner presidential circle — the direction and character of Russia's reform process has now changed. Russia is moving away from liberalism toward a system of "managed pluralism," where the state plays a stronger role in the country's political and economic life. This is not to suggest that further reform will not be enacted — but the government will now control the scope and pace of change.
In a second Putin administration, Russia may become more predictable, a country with stable, if more limited, zones of pluralism, a Russia predisposed to cooperate with the United States on key issues of mutual concern but less interested in developing a "partnership" with the West. The process of consolidation is under way.
— Nikolas K. Gvosdev is editor of In the National Interest.