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Overthrowing Saddam
By James S. Robbins, a national-security analyst & NRO contributor |
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EDITOR'S NOTE: This is the first of a five-part analysis that scrutinizes Saddam Hussein's regime, its opponents, the international context, and the covert and overt methods that could be used to bring about its downfall. Step one is having a clear understanding Saddam Hussein's means of rule and self-preservation. Iraq has been under authoritarian rule of one stripe or another since its inception over 80 years ago. In any authoritarian regime the most dangerous threats come from within, thus the wise dictator erects a government oriented principally towards ensuring his physical survival. At the center of the structure in question is Saddam Hussein, president of Iraq since 1979, a ruthless, suspicious, narcissistic, politically skilled survivor. He is an emotionally insecure megalomaniac with a talent for extricating himself from disasters of his own creation. While many of his diplomatic moves seem left-footed, it is hard to deny his adroitness at maintaining power. An essential element of this success is Saddam's use of his extended family in important positions of authority. Stories about relations in this circle read like Suetonius's Lives of the Caesars — rife with rivalries, assassinations, jealousies, intermarriages, sexual excesses, and all manner of cruelty. To call such a family "dysfunctional" would be an understatement. But at some level they are united, if only by their well-founded fear of the consequences should they turn on each other openly. The family is not beloved of the Iraqi people, to put it mildly. The most important member of the family, and Saddam's probable successor, is his son Qusayy. Born in 1966, Qusayy holds important posts in the Revolutionary Command Council, the Regional Command, the Security Council, and as deputy head of the Baath party's military bureau. He has seen his star rise over the past several years, in large part due to the volatile and unpredictable behavior of his older brother, and Saddam's erstwhile heir apparent, Udayy. Udayy controls the Iraqi press, sports, and has been, off and on, head of the "Martyrs of Saddam," a special militia unit trained to control the streets of Baghdad in case of an uprising. He is also one of Iraq's chief oil smugglers, and benefits in other important ways from the current United Nations sanctions regime. Udayy is emotionally erratic and given to fits of paranoid violence. Fear of Udayy was an important factor in the 1995 defection of Husayn Kamil and Saddam Kamil, both married to Saddam's daughters, who occupied important positions in Iraqi weapons-of-mass-destruction programs. Upon their return in 1996, at Saddam's urging and with guarantees of their personal safety, they were forced to divorce Saddam's daughters, then were killed along with other members of their families. Udayy was severely wounded in an assassination attempt the same year, and the perpetrators were never found. Recently (on Libyan radio) Udayy praised the "daring operations" carried out by Muslin youth on September 11, which "restored respect for the Arabs and Muslims" — thereby demonstrating his grasp of his father's subtlety in the fine art of diplomatic phrasemaking. He is reportedly obsessed with the idea of succeeding his father — although most observers favor Qusayy if it came to blows — but neither would be acceptable as a post-Saddam ruler. Saddam relies on the Iraqi tribal structure to administer the country. Saddam is from al Bu Nasser tribe in the Tikrit district, and his supporters are chiefly from tribes in the area of Tikrit and nearby Samarra. Tribal chiefs are given high rank in the ruling Baath party, and high-ranking Baathists are sometimes made tribal chiefs. They serve as provincial governors, mayors, and in other important political and administrative offices. Since tribes in these areas are part of the Sunni Arab minority (comprising around 20 percent of the Iraqi population), Saddam has engaged the cooperation of tribal leaders in the Shiite and Kurdish areas, or relied on transplanted Arab Sunnis when greater control is necessary. These ethnic ties are not always effective — a major revolt by the Dulaimi tribe was suppressed in 1995. But they form the structure within which Saddam distributes payments and privileges to keep the country under control and himself in power. The distribution scheme is fueled by the Iraqi economy, which Saddam treats as a personal checkbook. Money, influence, and control flow down through these channels from Baghdad. Loyalty to Saddam is richly rewarded, and people showing even hints of disloyalty are brutally punished. Yet, despite the occasional rogue element, Saddam cannot rule the country without these men, and he has lately been warning them of the challenges to come. At a speech to tribal leaders in December he entreated them to "show courage" in the difficult times ahead, specifying that he did not mean "in the abstract" but "to carry weapons to confront the enemy." The Baath party has instituted a course in urban warfighting for its members, overseen by Qusayy. Clearly, Saddam expects his cohorts to make the supreme sacrifice when the time comes. The army and air force defend Iraq's borders, but are not the mainstay of Saddam's personal power. In fact, as the largest armed institution in his country, the army constitutes his most significant potential threat. Its members obey him more out of fear than love, respect, or patriotism. Saddam has worked his troops hard during his reign. He has been at war of one type or another virtually since consolidating power in 1979. The army has paid heavily for Saddam's expansionist aspirations, suffering over a million estimated casualties in the inconclusive Iran-Iraq war, and additional thousands of casualties (and international ignominy) in Desert Storm. Its officers are punished harshly for Saddam's failures as well as their own. The army has been down a rough road since the heady days when it was described as "fourth largest in the world." Today its numbers have been reduced by two-thirds, and morale is shaky. Saddam's level of trust in his troops is reflected in that fact that for an army unit to move it must receive redundant orders from its own chain of command, from the Baath party representative (similar to a Soviet-era commissar) and the intelligence officer. And while on the move, army units may not carry ammunition. As an added guarantee, officers know that their families will be tortured or executed should they desert or mutiny. Saddam's most visible internal defense against his own army is the Republican Guard (RG), numbering about 50,000, and the more elite Special Republican Guard (SRG), around 10-20,000 strong, which is charged with the security of Baghdad. These units are under the command of Qusayy and Abd-al Hamid Humud, Saddam's chief bodyguard since 1970, a highly trusted family member. The RG serves an important military function as the counterassault force, committed to battle after the enemy has blunted its attacks on the frontline army units. It also helps motivate army troops to hold their ground — RG units will take strong action against Iraqi units making unscheduled retreats. Finally, the RG is always positioned between army forces and Baghdad to secure the regime from rebellious troops. RG and SRG units are better equipped, better trained and better paid than their army counterparts, and are recruited from more trusted segments of the society. Despite these incentives to loyalty, there have been cases of tribal rebellion in RG and even SRG units. The bulwark of Saddam's security is the internal intelligence apparatus, also headed by Qusayy and Hummed. It is the ultimate control and protection mechanism. Closest to Saddam are his few dozen personal bodyguards, the Companions (al Murafiqin). They are charged with his physical security at all times, and are the most trusted of the security personnel. The next ring is the Presidential or Palace Guard (Himaya) numbering several thousand, whose job is to oversee security in the Presidential palaces, house, bunkers and other facilities. Next are the 10,000 or so members of the Special Security Service (SSS, Al Amn al Khas). This group is the key pressure point of the regime, the most critical part of the security apparatus. It was established in 1985, and its members are drawn from only the most trusted tribes and families. It has generally eclipsed the power of the older Mukhabarat, or Department of General Intelligence. The SSS is entrusted with Saddam's physical security when traveling or whenever he is outside the purview of the Presidential Guard. The SSS also serves as the security force for the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction program, a tremendous responsibility considering that rogue elements in possession of WMD's could use them on Saddam himself. In addition, perhaps most importantly for purposes of this analysis, the SSS is the organ in charge of the regime's counterintelligence (Co-In). The Co-In section is the internal eyes and ears of Saddam, the coup-prevention mechanism, the immune system of the regime. Disrupt it and the whole power structure is in danger. Saddam's "counterintelligence state" is markedly similar in its structure and methods to that of Joseph Stalin, whom Saddam has openly praised. Co-In agents are distributed throughout Iraqi society, particularly in key power centers such as the army, the intelligence system, and even within counterintelligence itself. Their presence in the army is particularly strong, and greatly feared and resented. Co-In officers answer to a separate command structure, have much higher pay scales, and even the lower ranking officers can give orders to Iraqi generals that must be obeyed. When army units rebel, the Co-In agents are the first to be done away with. Iraq is a country devoid of trust. Saddam has waged a calculated, institutional assault on the bonds of normal human relationships in order to keep his regime in power, and Iraqi society is riddled with informers. Co-In agents "recruit" stool pigeons (frequently through blackmail) who keep an eye on those around them for manifestations of anti-Saddam tendencies. The identity of specific informers is not usually known (for their own safety), but every Iraqi citizen knows they are out these somewhere. The agents and their informers are not passive observers — sometimes they will engage in "provocations," e.g., they will utter anti-regime or other subversive sentiments to see who agrees, then report them, or report those who fail to report that someone was bad-mouthing Saddam. This has a valuable deterrent effect on potential conspiracies, because there is no reliable way of knowing whether the person attempting to enlist one in subversive activity is not actually working for counterintelligence. Nor would potential conspirators know whom they could approach without breaching their own security. Furthermore, since practically any form of grumbling could be construed as anti-regime sentiment, even simple friendships can become strained by doubt. A good example of provocation in action is the case of Hasib Aslan, an architect who worked on several of Saddam's palaces. Some friends invited Engineer Hasib to a party where they quizzed him on various details about the palaces — their lavishness, sophistication, interior design, and so forth. The architect chatted away — he was among friends, after all. But they were working for counterintelligence, and had invited Hasib in order specifically to test his ability to keep state secrets. Saddam's "palaces" are not merely homes; they are combination mansions, command and control centers, hardened bunkers, and WMD storage sites. The statements were reported to Saddam, who decided immediately to execute the indiscreet architect. A memo was then issued to others in the engineering department of the presidential office warning against leaking sensitive information. Engineer Hasib's story is one of countless similar tales that illustrate the depth of paranoia of the Iraqi regime. Or perhaps a better word is caution. It isn't paranoia when they are out to get you, and as history and experience have shown, there are many out to get Saddam. (Tuesday: The Opposition) |
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he debate over whether
to bring about Saddam Hussein's overthrow is over. The only questions
that remain are how, when, and what happens after. Saddam is noteworthy
among Iraqi rulers for his longevity, his brutality, and the extent
to which he has placed Iraq at the center of global politics. He
has been a resourceful adversary, and claims, not without justification,
to have won significant victories in recent years. Nevertheless,
his economy has been weakened by a decade of economic sanctions,
and the changes in global politics wrought by the September 11 attacks
have brought Saddam to the brink of his greatest challenge. He can
be counted on to resist allied efforts to end his rule (if not his
life). This, in turn, compels allied planners to approach their
task free of misconceptions and with full benefit of their recent
experiences in the war on terror.
