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conomists
have developed a variety of measures to gauge future economic activity,
and they are largely based on the fact that consumer spending accounts
for about two-thirds of total spending. However, these measures
are at best contemporaneous. To develop a forward-looking indicator,
we need to forecast or obtain estimates of how these variables are
likely to change in the future.
For that reason,
in addition to tracking the great real-time indicator of the stock
market a variety of economists focus on a number of surveys that
try to measure consumer and business sentiment about the future.
The argument being that when consumers are feeling confident about
the future they are more likely to spend and hence drive the economy.
The most widely
used index in this category is the Conference Board's Consumer Confidence
Index (charted below). It polls 5,000 households and asks them how
they feel about current and future economic conditions.

A similar index
is computed by the Purchasing Manager's Index (below), which surveys
roughly four-hundred manufacturing executives. Other forward-looking
indicators include the Help Wanted Ads and the Leading Economic
Indicators (also charted below).



Looking at
the troughs and peaks of the chart series above, it appears that
the forward-looking indicators do indeed lead real GDP. The lead
relationship is a major building block in any forecasting relationship.
Knowledge of the indicators may in fact help forecast the path of
the economy. Hence, the evidence does suggest that the forward-looking
indicators may in fact be useful in forecasting real GDP growth.
Looking at
the previous four charts, however, it is also clear that the forecast
would not be very precise.
Keynesians,
of course, use many of these indices as inflation indicators. According
to Keynesian logic, as capacity utilization and employment increase
(or unemployment declines), our ability to churn out more products
is strained. To increase capacity, companies have to raise prices
and that triggers inflation.
The data is
not too kind to this Keynesian hypothesis. Looking at the relationship
described in the figures below, it is fairly apparent that the peaks
in one series are associated with troughs in the other series. The
data posit a negative relationship between the rate of change in
the Capacity Utilization rate and the inflation rate (below, top)
as well as a negative relationship between the rate of increase
in employment levels and the inflation rate (below, bottom).


The relationship
identified in these charts are the opposite of what the Keynesian
hypothesis predicts. An increase in the growth rate of the employment
level, the capacity utilization rate, or the leading indicators
is associated with lower, not higher, inflation. Looking at the
data it is also apparent that the amplitude of the fluctuations
changes dramatically around the early 1980s, and from that point
on, the negative relationship appears to be weaker and almost nonexistent.
The story with
the unemployment rate (charted below) is quite different. It appears
that during the pre-1980s period, inflation leads the unemployment
rate. Thus, if one takes the temporal precedence as a causal relation,
we end up with inflation causing unemployment, not the other way
around. How can we explain this relationship? Bracket creep. Rising
inflation pushes people into higher marginal tax rates, destroying
incentives to work and produce. The higher tax rate produces lower
output and higher inflation, or as we used to call it in the '70s:
stagflation (a situation that is close to a theoretical impossibility
in the simple Keynesian model - yet we lived through it!).

A final point
to make is that the relationship between inflation and the various
indicators weakens significantly from the 1980s onward. The answer
to this little puzzle lies in the price rule. Recall the workings
of the price rule: Whenever the inflation rate is above the target
level there is too much money in the system, so the Fed pulls money
out by selling bonds in the open market. On the other hand, when
the inflation rate falls below the target rate there is too little
money in the system, so the Fed corrects the deficiency by buying
bonds in the open market, thereby increasing the quantity of money
in the economy.
If the Fed
adheres to a strict price rule there should be no systematic relationship
between the real economy and the inflation rate. In fact, in an
idealized case, the inflation rate will remain constant irrespective
of the fluctuations in the real economy. However, to the extent
that the price rule is not strictly adhered to, or that there are
violations of the price rule, a systematic relationship will be
observed between the inflation rate and the real economy.
Looking at
the last three charts, it is apparent that since the 1980s, inflation
has steadied around the 2% to 3% range. Furthermore, the relationship
between the inflation rate and the real variables is much weaker
than it was during the 1970s. These results are consistent with
the price-rule hypothesis. Finally, notice that during the price
rule period that deviations from the inflation trend are associated
with deviations in the real economy indices. These episodes can
be interpreted as temporary deviations from the price rule. These
are the times when Alan Greenspan has attempted to fine-tune the
economy.
Inflation is
too much money chasing too few goods, and a decline in the real
economy signals a rise in the inflation rate and vice versa, hence
the negative relationship between the two.
What
Do the Tea Leaves Tell Us?
The contemporaneous indicators (discussed in Part
I) provide a clear picture of what we already know: that the
economy is slowing. These indicators point to an absence of a relationship
with inflation during the periods of strict adherence to the price
rule. Deviations from the price rule are accompanied by a negative
relationship between the inflation rate and real GDP growth. This
leads one to conclude that attempts by Greenspan to fine-tune the
economy only results in higher uncertainty, as the fine-tuning ends
up destabilizing the economy and the financial markets.
More interesting
insights are provided by the forward-looking indicators (charted
above), as they suggest that the economic slide will continue at
least one more quarter. Interestingly, the Leading Economic Indicators
and the Purchasing Mangers Index appear to be signaling a trough
in the economy. If these indicators are correct, the recession will
be a short one.
Going forward,
the phase-in of the Bush economic package will only delay the incentives
to recognize income until next year. Therefore, through the remainder
of the fourth quarter, one can expect the economic slowdown to continue.
Once the New Year begins and the tax-rate cuts take effect, the
economy will pick up. If the markets recognize the effects of the
phase-in, they will see through the temporary slowdown and begin
to recover. The recent strength of the financial markets remains
consistent with this forecast.
Return to "Economic
Tea Leaves, Part
I"
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