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May 24, 2002 8:45 a.m. Joe’s Fishing Trip How the Lieberman subpoena vote changed the Enron investigation.

n January 24, when chairman Joseph Lieberman opened the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee's first hearing on the collapse of Enron, he said the inquiry would focus sharply on two areas. The first was the "internal malfeasance of Enron and its auditors, the role of the board of directors, conflicts of interest, offshore tax havens and insider trading." That probe, Lieberman said, would be conducted by investigations subcommittee chairman Sen. Carl Levin. The second part of the investigation would examine "the external controls and protectors, the federal agencies and laws" and would "ask why in this case they couldn't better protect the thousands of employees and investors who have suffered from Enron's untimely and unnatural demise." That investigation would be headed by Lieberman himself, and he pledged that it would be a "rigorous, nonpartisan investigation producing concrete proposals for reform."

Now, four months later, Lieberman seems to be pursuing another course, one that has led to a deep partisan split in the committee and has opened Lieberman, the 2000 Democratic vice-presidential candidate who is considering a run for president in 2004, to accusations that his investigation is aimed more at inflicting political damage on the White House than examining the roles played by federal agencies in the Enron collapse.

By issuing a subpoena to the White House for documents concerning its contacts with Enron, Lieberman has come up with a few revelations about the role Enron executives played in staffing the Bush administration, as well as the role the company played in the creation of the vice president's energy policy. There might be more news to come. But it's not what Lieberman set out to investigate, and it's not likely to produce concrete proposals for reform.

Look at the information White House counsel Alberto Gonzales sent to Lieberman Wednesday night, just hours after the Governmental Affairs Committee approved the subpoenas on a straight party-line vote. "Our inquiries thus far have disclosed no instance in which Enron approached any person within the Executive Office of the President or the Office of the Vice President seeking help in connection with its financial difficulties prior to bankruptcy," Gonzales wrote. "In addition, the communications we have identified thus far reflect only appropriate and responsible actions by government officials."

In a seven-page summary of White House/Enron contacts, Gonzales listed dozens of previously undisclosed instances in which Enron officials communicated with the White House. A few examples:

On February 22, 2001, top Enron executives Ken Lay and Linda Robertson met with the staff director of the vice president's National Energy Policy Development Group.

In early 2001, Lay had two telephone conversations with top political adviser Karl Rove. In one call, Lay asked that Rove meet with an environmentalist who was in favor of the Kyoto global-warming treaty (Lay also supported Kyoto). Rove never had the meeting. In the other call, Lay supported the appointment of Nora Brownell to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Brownell, who the White House says also had the support of several other people, including a Democratic senator. In all, the White House says Lay recommended 21 people for jobs in the administration. Three were hired.

Robert McNally, an aide to the president who dealt with economic policy, met several times in April, May, and June 2001 with groups of energy executives, including representatives of Enron.

On April 9, 2001, an Enron official named Thomas Briggs took part in a group discussion of energy matters with the staff of Cheney's task force.

On April 17, Ken Lay and Linda Robertson met with Cheney for half an hour to discuss, according to the White House, energy policy and the energy crisis in California.

Gonzales's letter includes many more examples of the same sort of thing. It also includes a number of examples, some previously reported, in which administration officials discussed among themselves the question of whether Enron's collapse would have a devastating effect on energy markets. The officials decided that it would not, and took no action.

What does it all mean? The White House information is not complete — in a few places it includes vague references, such as saying that Lindsey had "a few communications with Ken Lay in the winter and spring of 2001, most likely about the California electricity shortage." But in all, the White House disclosures show that there were more communications between Enron executives and administration officials than had previously been made public.

The problem for Lieberman is that none of it seems to have anything to do with the reason he said he was investigating the Enron collapse. If Gonzales's statement that there were "no requests by Enron for help from the Executive Office of the President or the Office of the Vice President in connection with Enron's financial difficulties" is accurate, then there is simply not much for Lieberman to work with — if he wants to stay true to his stated purpose of examining the performance of federal regulatory agencies in dealing with the Enron collapse and producing concrete proposals for reform.

"There's no there there," says a GOP Hill aide. "None of that is relevant to trying to prevent another Enron, which the chairman is saying is our ostensible goal." If that continues to be the case — and Republicans believe no evidence will emerge suggesting that the White House played any role in Enron's collapse — then Lieberman will either have to shut down that part of his investigation or come up with a new reason for investigating the White House.

Look for the latter. In the coming months, it is likely that a significant portion of the Lieberman investigation will seamlessly morph from a probe of the actions of regulatory agencies to an inquiry into Enron's voice in formulating the national energy policy and in staffing the Bush administration. Both might be interesting — although at the moment there seems to be little likelihood that Lieberman will find any evidence of wrongdoing — but neither will have anything to do with Lieberman's original intent. And such a change will only amplify the Republican voices complaining that Lieberman's investigation is politically motivated.

A statement Lieberman released on Thursday seems to recognize the problem. "Even the inadequate information provided yesterday shows a larger number of contacts between the Executive Office of the President and Enron than previously known," Lieberman said. "I don't know whether learning more about those contacts will ultimately tell us that the government could or should have done something different with respect to Enron; as I emphasized yesterday, we are committed to being investigatory, not accusatory." That comes as close as Lieberman can come to saying that he is on a fishing expedition.

And all indications are that Lieberman will keep fishing. "This is partial information," says a Democratic aide of the White House letter. "We want the full story of who was at these meetings and what they discussed and when they took place and who called whom." The aide continued: "It's clear that there were communications with the White House, and it's something that the American people need to know."

Does that have anything to do with "the external controls and protectors, the federal agencies and laws" that regulated Enron's businesses? Will it produce "concrete proposals for reform"? Probably not. But don't look for that to stop Joe Lieberman.